The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) personnel operating in the Arctic may be more behaviorally vulnerable to exploitation than ever before.
There have been increasing demonstrations of nations outside NATO normalizing persuasive technology behavioral design to target and victimize military communities online and in person. There are recent examples of Russian military personal smartphone use revealing their location in the Ukraine conflict and bountiful examples of social engineering online users to click on links to infect devices with malware, but persuasive technology design is much more expansive.
Persuasive technologies can be any software or hardware that we interact with online that influences our behaviors, including changing our behaviors and maintaining our behaviors. Examples could include everything from social media to fitness applications like Fitbit to games like Candy Crush and language learning applications like Duolingo.
Persuasive technologies can drive our choices and interaction online, making us vulnerable to collection or some other behavioral or technical exploitation of our accounts or information. This vulnerability may be heightened in environments like the Arctic because these personnel are isolated and far from home in a uniquely contested geopolitical and intelligence domain.
The number of people deploying to or establishing operating presence in the Arctic region is steadily growing, which has resulted in a growing need for infrastructure to support them. That infrastructure has included Starlink Wi-Fi access not just for facilitating military and scientific activities, but for the morale of personnel deployed to these isolated environments. Starlink provided similar internet infrastructure to personnel in Antarctica for personal use. Generally, the more people are available and approachable online the more vulnerable they are. While there is more attention on unmanned applications in the Arctic to respond to the need for surveillance and monitoring in this isolated region, there will still be a surge in deployments.
While much of the recent public commentary on Arctic security gaps has appeared to focus on raising “all-domain awareness”, there is limited discussion exploring the behavioral vulnerabilities of NATO personnel deployed to this isolated region. Many of the NATO nations concentrating on the Arctic have mostly vocalized concern about growing Russian infrastructure. There are growing calls for hypervigilance to watch and respond to these adversaries.
This article explores how this massing commercial infrastructure and military and intelligence personnel in what is likely to become one of the most contested regions in the world could increasingly be technically and behaviorally exploited.
In this article, I will introduce the shifting research direction of persuasive technologies since this framework was developed approximately two decades ago.
First, outlining the design and influence of persuasive technologies can help us understand how vulnerable NATO communities could be in the Arctic region, because we can visualize how NATO personnel might use persuasive technologies for several reasons, namely communicating with family or playing video games on their smartphones, for example.
Second, understanding how persuasive technologies can be applied by adversarial intelligence and militaries targeting NATO personnel can help practitioners and researchers identify this kind of designed behavioral exploitation. This article will visualize two brief theoretical scenarios where persuasive technology design could be operationalized targeting NATO military personnel in the Arctic region.
When I was previously a Supervisory Special Agent and profiler with the FBI’s Behavioral Analysis Unit, I provided hundreds of behaviorally based recommendations to investigators. These behaviorally based recommendations concentrated on the victimology between the victim and the offender, meaning who they were victimizing and how they were victimizing someone provided some insight on how vulnerable the offender might be to an approach online or influence. That analysis would often include application of frameworks like persuasive technologies to consider their demonstrated behavior online, so I could identify vulnerabilities in their behaviors and how they interacted with online applications and platforms.
This article suggests in a similar context that we must recognize as a starting point that adversarial nations are likely incorporating persuasive technologies into the design and operationalization of their targeting campaigns against NATO communities, in particular NATO communities deployed or stationed in isolated contested regions like the Arctic.
Fig.2. AI-generated image of enemy soldiers hacking phones in the Arctic.
A “Seismic Shift” in NATO Arctic Activity While the “Psychophysiological Impact” on People is Misunderstood
There have been increasing calls in the past couple years for expansion of the NATO mission in the Arctic region, including potentially forming a new Arctic NATO command.
Although there is no official NATO Arctic policy, NATO investment in Arctic defense continues to grow and there are consistent public statements about how essential the Arctic is to NATO’s deterrence and defense posture. The Arctic Institute in late October characterized some of the military and governmental institutional movements in the Arctic region as a “seismic shift”.
Some of these movements have included Russia’s growing cooperation with China as a “near Arctic state” which also has growing mobility and influence in the Arctic region. The United States established its first Ambassador at Large for Arctic Affairs. There was a signed joint declaration of intent almost a year ago among some NATO partner nations to form a joint Nordic air force and to increase information sharing.
Arctic states Sweden and Finland joined NATO. NATO held its largest artillery exercise in history in Europe in late November, which included drills in Finland’s Arctic. The incoming Trump Administration recently vocalized the importance of Greenland in the security of that region, suggesting American interests in have a greater presence in Greenland.
Some of that shifting attention to the Arctic is because of Russia’s and China’s movements, but also because the “radical geophysical” changes in the environment there such as melting ice suggest the Arctic may be ice free within the next 50 years.
There is also suggestion that the conflict between Ukraine and Russia has accelerated the Arctic as a “theater of global competition”, that this region is increasingly characterized by competition rather than cooperation. An American think tank highlighted the vulnerable communications and energy infrastructure “at risk of sabotage and interference” in this region dominated across the landscape in size by Russia and increased Russian and Chinese maritime presence. This same recent report on vulnerabilities in the Arctic focused more on undersea cables and oil shortages and satellite shortcomings in this environment, but the increased communications and internet infrastructure provided by commercial enterprises also present significant vulnerabilities and, as this article highlights, concentrated targeting of NATO personnel.
A report and red team study by NATO in August on the use of generative artificial intelligence in social media in advertising disinformation campaigns demonstrated the effectiveness of this targeted content on a general control sample of online users. The contrast in the Arctic is simply that anyone in the Arctic representing NATO will be a target of interest not only isolated geographically but isolated or concentrated in terms of infrastructure and communications use. Nations with a role in security in the Arctic can share information on information threats, but ultimately persuasive technologies design explicitly targets personal behavior and use online.
A recent NAVI research article attempted to characterize a working definition of a NATO military cyber victimology, recognizing that military communities are uniquely vulnerable to behavioral exploitation online because of their access in the military and because of the cultures of those militaries when confronted with situations that could cause shame.
More importantly, many military personnel experience a far greater range of stress over time during deployments and conflicts and that stress changes people.
An exploratory National Intelligence University study found among a sample of American military personnel who deployed in the past few years to similar “isolated intelligence domains” like the Arctic and Antarctica that younger personnel were more likely to use gaming applications on their smartphones than middle-aged personnel. While that finding may not be surprising, what was surprising was that middle-aged personnel tended to feel less lonely than younger personnel. There are several possible explanations for this preliminary finding, but this more recent research on the effects of isolation and loneliness on deployed military personnel and their use of persuasive technologies is crucial considering the growing population of military personnel deployed to the Arctic region will likely be younger. These kinds of studies are rare.
Some of the early anthropological and ethnographic research conducted in Arctic communities in the 1970s focused closely on the effects of the environment and other social factors on communities that were isolated and mobile in this region. Many of those communities were indigenous. That starting point provided some context for exploring the effect of that same environment on people visiting that region for shorter or longer durations.
Social psychologist Veronika Sharok conducted assessments of the psychological characteristics of the kinds of people who adapt best to the Arctic environment. Sharok found that generally the people who expressed the greatest interest in deploying to the Arctic adapted better to that environment and the people who stayed for a longer duration maintained a better relationship with their families. The people who tended to “fly-in fly-out” which may be the best approximation of military personnel on short-term deployments did not adapt well to the Arctic conditions and generally evaluated themselves to be less happy and less connected with their families at home. Sharok highlighted consistent findings in past research and in her research that found that interpersonal relationships seemed to have the greatest influence on coping behaviors and psychological well-being in such a harsh, isolated environment.
This article notes that persuasive technologies explicitly fill that gap in social relationships and coping behaviors that many people do not have or need.
Russian researchers more recently highlighted how the development of industries and infrastructure in the Arctic region has not thoroughly considered and measured the “psychophysiological” impact of working conditions and environment on people. This environment makes “special demands” on people beyond their physical health, especially in terms of their mental health. The researchers noted as an example of an unexplored factor on people in this region the effect of magnetic and solar storms in this region on people living in this region for a period of time. In some cases, someone’s circadian rhythm can change.
Fig.3. AI-generated image of NATO military personnel on their phones in the Arctic.
Persuasive technology research shifting to more deceptive contexts?
Social scientist B.J. Fogg first named persuasive technology, which he defined as any interactive computing system designed to change or maintain peoples’ attitudes or behaviors.
Fogg coined the phrase “captology” to characterize the limited space at the time in the early 2000s where technologies and persuasion overlapped in peoples’ lives, anywhere there was human-computer interaction. Fogg emphasized that captology focuses on the planned persuasive effects of the technology, not on the ‘side effects’ of that technology.
Fogg recognized the social environment online and offline also shaped how responsive a user with complex behaviors might be to suggestions built into persuasive technology, but he wanted to know if how motivated someone was to perform a behavior or if they were capable of performing that behavior made more of a difference than the persuasive technology. Ultimately, adversary nations and criminal groups would attempt to victimize the deployed NATO personnel who may be more motivated than their peers to use some persuasive technology for some purpose, such as communicating back home to family or finding love on a dating platform.
But beyond those kinds of psychological underpinnings, Fogg was intent on mostly health-related persuasive technologies not being used in a coercive or deceptive way. However, the development and application of persuasive technologies for deception and influence has largely muted Fogg’s concern.
Information systems science researchers Harri Oinas-Kukkonen and Marja Harjumaa in the process of developing a systematic framework for designing persuasive systems found that whether a persuasive technology is characterized as coercive or deceptive makes little difference, as peoples’ attitudes and behaviors can be shaped or changed or reinforced with persuasive technology, whether deception or coercion is designed into that technology or not.
Machine reasoning researcher Timotheus Kampik argued that most researchers continue to find also that the concept of deception is the root of much persuasive technology and artificial intelligence research and application, so that deception in persuasive technology not only occurs on purpose, but also “occasionally and unintentionally”.
Deception is generally defined as creating erroneous sensemaking in someone so that they make a decision that is advantageous to the deceiver.
Kampik expanded the range of persuasive technology applications, exploring knowledge sharing websites like Stack Exchange, video sharing platforms like YouTube, and enterprise instant messaging applications like Slack and source code sharing site GitHub.
In another example, Kampik analyzed subscription news media sites, such as the Washington Post online. When potential users see headlines written to attract readers (i.e. clickbait), sometimes the written content that must be subscribed to for users to read does not reflect the headline entirely. Kampik suggested this is a form of deception in the persuasive technology of that online news content site and subscription service, even if this characterization is less recognized.
These applications all reflect persuasive technology design, where the design of those applications is meant to drive engagement by anticipated users based on several motivations.
Spitaletta, Matthaeus, and Guadian wrote that the development of persuasive technologies has accelerated over the past decade due to advances in software engineering and data technologies, “from bespoke solutions in healthcare and assistive technologies to malign influence ecosystems”. Spitaletta et al. wrote that this new environment has become the “decisive battleground for political and psychological warfare”.
Spitaletta et al. also emphasized that there has always been concern about social media platforms because they are also persuasive by design, but machine learning and large language model development has dramatically advanced the ability of persuasive technologies to adapt to customized users and aggregate user input.
Fig.4. AI-generated image of a NATO military person on his phone in the Arctic.
Visualizing Scenarios of Operationalizing Persuasive Technology Design
The following two theoretical scenarios visualize possible applications of persuasive technology design targeting NATO military personnel deployed in the Arctic region.
Scenario 1: “Women’s Soccer Manager Soccer Fan”
This iPhone or Android game was developed by a Danish gaming company in approximately 2018. The Danish smartphone gaming application market is much more available to the potential users that could be targeting NATO military personnel downloading and playing this game.
This game can be logistically intensive, which might be ideal if deployed to an isolated region where there is more time than normal outside of daily mission tasks or functions. Users can create rosters for their team from real players and real soccer leagues, negotiate contracts for their players, and manage their customized team through training camp and an entire season. This season is fictional, but considerable attention would be required for maintaining the team. This game can also be downloaded onto Steam, which is a gaming platform for regular gamers where users can chat as well.
There are plausible contexts where nation state military targeting NATO military personnel in the Arctic could learn through human or technical collection that someone of interest for recruitment or exploitation is spending much of their time online playing this game. That information could be sufficient for a nation state military or intelligence unit to create a controlled account or sock puppet that also plays this game and shares common interests, demonstrated in their own fictional team. Because the user playing this game may be more likely to be a woman, the controlled account would also likely appear to be a woman who may be able to connect more easily with the targeted NATO female military personnel, because there are limited numbers of women in NATO military communities and even fewer deployed to regions like the Arctic. These isolated deployment locations are likely staffed mostly with men, which could present several social challenges to the targeted NATO personnel that may make them more vulnerable to communication with someone who appears to be like them online.
This relationship development based on persuasive technology design is comprehensive, facilitating several plausible approaches for future behavioral and technical exploitation. Communicating with someone on Steam about this game is less scrutinized because the platform is public and has no association with the military or government.
Scenario 2: “Duolingo Finnish Language Peer”
This iPhone or Android free or paid language learning account is widely accessible and has become increasingly popular with users around the world. Smartphone platforms and applications that are more familiar to users are generally scrutinized less, too, including the users on that platform or application that a user might interact with.
NATO military personnel from member nations who are deployed to the Arctic region may be interested in learning Finnish because some of their deployed peers are from Finland.
While there could be several motivations for someone to want to learn Finnish in this scenario, the persuasive technology of this language learning program which is gamified and encourages continued interaction maintains that behavior or encourages that behavior. There are limited opportunities to message another user on this platform, such as when a user achieves a learning badge, but that limited opportunity for contact may be sufficient to make initial contact without the user scrutinizing that contact as much. Praising someone who also appears to be learning the same language as you are a form of Liking and could influence continued communication.
The outcome the targeted user may be interested in accomplishing is to be able to communicate in Finnish with his or her peers and to develop relationships with those peers. This kind of persuasive technology can facilitate that outcome and maintain or encourage behavior to achieve it. But this is also a vulnerability, because a nation state military or intelligence unit can craft a behaviorally based approach or interaction based on this persuasive technology to build a trusting relationship or exploit the NATO military user of interest in some behavioral or technical manner.
In both theoretical scenarios, the initial contact and communication occurs online from people that appear to be like the user of interest and on platforms that rely on commercial infrastructure and commercial telecommunication networks instead of government platforms.
This infrastructure is highly vulnerable to compromise and collection and people familiar with it based on personal use generally scrutinize those platforms and the people on them less.
Fig.5. AI-generated image of NATO military personnel in the Arctic.
Discussion
Kaptein found in another study that every person appears to have a different susceptibility as a user of persuasive technologies to the influence of whatever that technology may be.
He highlighted that in situations where there is an opportunity for adapting to a user’s behaviors, it can enhance the effectiveness or influence of that persuasive technology. Kaptein was exploring more manual, incremental changes in user experience.
But consider the exponential information collection and adaptation with machine learning and large language models as the engines of these persuasive technologies, as Spitaletta et al. referred to earlier. Kaptein called this incremental user experience modification adaptive persuasive systems, but arguably the design and application of persuasive technologies can be reimagined on a greater, more disruptive level in the context of artificial intelligence.
Technology philosopher Floridi Luciano (2024) noted that artificial intelligence likely represents another “significant leap” in the field of persuasive technologies. Luciano suggested the online persuasion of persuasive technologies identifying and shaping a user’s demand and supplying the content in response to that demand or desire could be characterized as hyper-persuasion or hypersuasion. Luciano referred to Burtell and Woodside (2023) who wrote:
The relentless nature of AI’s hypersuasion, the magnitude of its scope, its availability, affordability, and degree of efficiency based on machine-generated content accurately tailored to individual users or consumers who spend increasing amounts of their lives onlife (both online and offline) in the infosphere overshadow its precursors, not only in terms of the depth of personalized influence but also for the potential scale of distribution and impact.
Luciano added that artificial intelligence can and will be used more commonly and effectively to manipulate someone’s views, preferences, choices, likes and displaces, hopes and fears.
This article suggests surveying NATO civilian and military personnel use of social media platforms and applications that are generally considered personal. Surveying NATO civilians and military personnel deployed to these isolated environments could establish an initial baseline for use of these kinds of applications to reveal potential vulnerabilities that could be targeted.
There may already be an emphasis on training and familiarizing military personnel to the dangers of sharing information about themselves on social media and how public information or even information collected from some of the persuasive technologies mentioned in this article could be exploited in some way, such as locating them or establishing a timeline for their deployment, but understanding how often personnel use particular types of applications and platforms could help concentrate that training and counterintelligence awareness efforts. Encouraging NATO civilian and military personnel to reflect on what kind of applications they are using the most frequently and why could also highlight their behaviors online that are being collected on and information about their behaviors that could be behaviorally exploited. This effort could raise their awareness, which might improve their own security practices and limit the threat of collection and exploitation of collateral information from their online behaviors that could reveal vulnerabilities in their military or civilian unit or related personnel.
This article also suggests that there should be increased scrutiny of commercial vendors providing communications and online infrastructure in these environments for personal use. While there may already be protocol for reviewing solicitations for commercial infrastructure for government or military use in these environments, there should be additional examination of the potential vulnerabilities in these corporation’s infrastructure. Hostile nation states will surely target vulnerabilities first in commercial infrastructure rather than attempt to compromise government networks on that infrastructure.
The “isolated intelligence domains” referred to in this article could include not only the Arctic and Antarctica, but future domains in space that are just as uniquely contested among nations, such as land on the Moon or even land on Mars. These are rough environments where geopolitical norms are slightly different than the rest of the world and where that massing commercialization and commodification of infrastructure and development in these regions alongside the military put NATO military personnel at greater vulnerability than some of the more hotly contested zones of conflict in Europe where there is concern the conflict in Ukraine could expand into neighboring NATO nations.
Tim Pappa is a cyber deception theorist and practitioner with Walmart Global Tech’s Cyber Deception Operations team. Tim was previously a Supervisory Special Agent and certified profiler with the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI) Behavioral Analysis Unit (BAU), one of the only FBI profilers in the world specializing in online influence and cyber deception. Tim is also a Senior Behavioral Consultant for Analyst and a Strategy and Statecraft Fellow with the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). Tim is also an Adjunct with Capitol Technology University, instructing on comparative global cyber norms and influence. Tim has published in the Journal of Information Warfare and American Intelligence Journal, and presented selected papers at various international cyber deception and cyber warfare conferences.
- Tim Pappahttps://nato-veterans.org/author/timpappa/
