The Sahel, a vast semi-arid region spanning northern Africa, holds significant strategic, geographical, and economic importance as a crossroads for migration, trade, and cultural exchange. Stretching from the Atlantic Ocean to the Red Sea, it acts as a bridge between the Sahara Desert and the Sudanian savannas, covering over 3 million square kilometers across countries like Mauritania, Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, Chad, and Sudan.
Yet this historical hub for trade and culture has not shielded the region from severe challenges. In the 21st century, the Sahel has transformed into a hotbed of insecurity, facing intertwined challenges that pose serious regional and global stability risks. The region’s rapid population growth, one of the fastest in the world, puts immense pressure on already scarce resources, leading to widespread environmental degradation and persistent poverty. The Sahel’s vast yet untapped mineral wealth and renewable energy potential offer significant economic opportunities, but these remain largely unexploited due to weak governance, poor infrastructure, and a reliance on subsistence agriculture. While the region holds promise for development, its chronic poverty, political instability, and underdevelopment have created a fertile ground for insecurity, driven by armed groups that exploit these vulnerabilities.
A complex security environment
The new Sahel has also become a battleground for a wide array of actors, including state governments, terrorist organizations, and transnational criminal networks. Extremist groups like Al Qaeda and the Islamic State (in the Sahel and West African Provinces) have established deep footholds, taking advantage of weak governance and fragile state institutions. This surge in violent extremism has transformed the region into a crucial front in the global fight against terrorism. The Sahel’s security challenges do not remain confined within its borders; the instability directly affects North Africa and Europe. Extremism, organized crime, and irregular migration are key vectors through which insecurity spreads, threatening the stability of neighboring regions and fueling migration flows to Europe, triggering concerns for global powers, including NATO member states.
Amid this complex security environment, regional political institutions have struggled to address these challenges effectively. The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the primary economic and development body for the region, has found itself increasingly undermined by political upheaval, particularly with the rise of military juntas in Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso. Since early 2024, these three countries have openly questioned ECOWAS’s mandate, sparking a crisis of legitimacy for the organization. The constant threat of these countries withdrawing from the regional bloc reflects growing antagonism towards an institution increasingly perceived as serving Western interests. Currently, Senegal has taken on the role of mediator, with the new pan-Africanist and socialist president, Faye, determined to revitalize the process of integration and development among West African countries.
This situation has led to a breakdown in institutional cooperation, negatively impacting ECOWAS’s ability to address security challenges in the area. The lack of dialogue and growing distrust among parties has exacerbated the situation, making it difficult to implement effective policies to combat terrorism, conflict, and violence.
Simultaneously, the three military juntas have restructured their security and defense strategies, adopting a more isolationist approach through trilateral cooperation within the Alliance of Sahel States (AES/SSA). The freeze of the G5 Sahel and its joint forces at the end of 2023 has intensified the divide between regional countries and traditional international powers involved in counterterrorism and other security challenges, including transnational organized crime. This policy of isolation extending beyond the AES/SSA’s boundaries not only limits the response capacity to immediate threats but also undermines trust in regional institutions and previously established security commitments.
The rising tension among regional countries is also evident in recent disputes, such as the oil blockade between Benin and Niger, the civilian casualties along the Mali-Mauritania border, and accusations of destabilization between Burkina Faso and Côte d’Ivoire, which reflect a climate of distrust increasingly leading to violence and social rejection.
Much of this redefinition of regional structures and alliances stems from the inability of previous models to provide effective responses to current security threats in the Sahel. For the fourth consecutive year, the region stands as the global epicenter of jihadist terrorism, surpassing all other world locations in terms of attack volume. This form of jihadism, with a primarily local agenda, is nonetheless influenced by the undeniable presence and power of the two major global terrorist movements: Al Qaeda and ISIS, which continue to expand across large areas of Mali, Niger, Burkina Faso, and increasingly into the Gulf of Guinea, especially Togo, and Benin.
With the weakening of these movements’ central leadership, regional affiliates have taken on a more active and prominent role in the new strategy of decentralizing transnational terrorism. In the Sahel, the Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims (JNIM) stands out as the organization that has capitalized on the dynamics of violence, responsible for over half of the attacks recorded in the area in 2023. Al Qaeda-affiliated JNIM has not only expanded its presence but also increased its activity and operational range compared to other regional-based groups. Despite JNIM’s apparent dominance in terrorist activities, ISIS’ province in the Sahel has not lagged, deploying significant forces in eastern Mali, eastern Burkina Faso, and southwestern Niger, contributing to a persistently expanding environment of violence.
The current insecurity in the Sahel not only fuels armed violence but also reopens new spaces for criminal economies. This phenomenon is accompanied by a rise in criminal activities such as kidnappings, rapes, and extortion, as well as the control of both legal and illegal resources. The struggle for control of routes, goods, and profits is triggering future conflicts beyond the political sphere, in a criminal ecosystem where drug trafficking, arms smuggling, and human trafficking are common practices contested by some and agreed upon by others, depending on the interests and power balances of armed actors, state agents, and transnational organized groups.
In addition to terrorist and criminal movements, the Sahel is also home to groups fighting for greater autonomy or independence in certain regions, adding another challenge for national governments. This is the case with the Permanent Strategic Framework for the Defense of the Azawad People (CSP-DPA), a movement fighting for the liberation of Azawad (northern Mali), supported by foreign powers with the help of neighboring countries.
These armed groups have increasingly fluid support and alliances in the ongoing regional restructuring, closely tied to the process of geopolitical reorganization and international relations in the Sahel. The withdrawal of French forces, who led Operation Barkhane, and the troops of the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) in 2023 marked the end of an era of international security cooperation in the region, leaving a security vacuum that has been rapidly filled.
Arena for Geopolitical Competition: Enter Russian and Chinese influence
Over the past decade, Africa has witnessed a significant increase in Russian and Chinese influence. Both nations have actively pursued their economic and geostrategic objectives on the continent by forging stronger political, economic, and security ties with regional actors. Russia’s arrival in the Sahel has raised all alarms in the West as it becomes the main regional security partner at the expense of the previous Western presence. In Mali, Russia provides support through the Wagner Group. In Burkina Faso, Moscow has promised to increase military aid and fulfill the country’s energy aspirations by helping build a nuclear power plant. In Niger, Moscow is developing increasingly close military ties, leading the African nation to revoke its security agreements with the European Union and plan the withdrawal of U.S. forces from their last base in Agadez by September 15, 2024. Chad, on the periphery, also finds it increasingly advantageous to strengthen its ties with Moscow, as evidenced by the recent visit of its leader to the Russian capital and private discussions aimed at securing increased military support.
However, these new alliances between Russia and some Sahel countries are not without complications. From a humanitarian perspective, mercenaries and national forces have faced numerous accusations of severe human rights violations, including torture, extrajudicial executions, and arbitrary killings. Moreover, the competition to secure Russia as the primary partner is intensifying. In Mali, for instance, Russia and Türkiye are vying for this role in the defense industry, with the junta divided between those who support investing in Turkish resources through private companies and those who prefer to continue placing their trust and efforts in the Wagner Group/Africa Corps as a military partner and extension of Kremlin interests. Recent setbacks on the ground, such as the Wagner Group’s defeat alongside Malian Armed Forces (FAMa) in the border town of Tinzawatène near Algeria, signal potential rifts within the partnership, necessitating a reassessment of Russia’s and others’ operational strategies to safeguard their interests in the area. These are complex times for political analysts and military strategists in Moscow and for the legitimacy of the coup-installed juntas, eager to consolidate greater political power.
China, on the other hand, has pursued a more diplomatic approach, offering significant financial support and infrastructure investment in exchange for resource rights. Although less overt than Russia’s military involvement, China’s growing influence should not be underestimated. With a promise of over $50 billion in financing for Africa over the next three years, China is positioning itself as a key player in the continent’s development and defense. In the Sahel, China has already deepened its ties with countries like Mali by signing contracts to supply military equipment, training, and technology transfers, providing the junta with much-needed resources to bolster its security infrastructure.
The new reality in the Sahel, characterized by a strengthened bloc-based policy, confirms that the region has become a new arena for geopolitical competition among major and middle powers. International relations in the Sahel are marked by rising tensions, with various countries pursuing conflicting agendas to gain influence and strategic positioning over their geopolitical rivals. Examples include Ukraine’s active involvement in Sahel conflicts by supporting armed groups in northern Mali to counter Russia’s role or Mauritania’s struggles with some of its worst episodes of externally instigated protests. Indeed, the EU and the United States are working to curb Russia’s advance into new countries, having succeeded so far with Mauritania at a time when the U.S. and Russia seek to delineate their revisited lines of influence in the Sahel, for which Mauritania is a key piece in the international political roadmap.
What’s in it for NATO and Europe
This intensifying competition has prompted heightened engagement from various defense organizations, most notably NATO, which has identified the Sahel as a strategic priority. As part of its evolving Strategic Concept for the next decade, NATO is crafting an action plan -NATO’s Southern Flank- to confront growing security threats while navigating the region’s strategic rivalry with Russia and China. For NATO allies like Spain and Italy, the events in the Sahel present significant geostrategic challenges that threaten their security interests. As major regional actors in the Sahel drift away from Western partnerships, NATO has been forced to adjust its strategy, aiming to both stabilize the Sahel and prevent the further spread of armed groups and criminal networks that could undermine the security of North Africa and, ultimately, Europe.
In this context, NATO’s long-term strategy in the Sahel must prioritize building stronger relationships with nations still open to collaboration, such as Mauritania and Senegal. At the same time, the alliance must contend with the growing presence of Russia and China, whose influence continues to expand across the region. This evolving geopolitical reality calls for greater investment in diplomacy and capacity-building efforts, ensuring that any form of military involvement is carefully calibrated to avoid exacerbating conflicts or entrenching foreign dominance in an already volatile area.
The instability in the Sahel holds far-reaching implications for both regional and global security. The combination of jihadist expansion, criminal activities, and increasing external influence from non-Western powers risk aggravating existing conflicts, further destabilizing fragile states, and undermining international efforts aimed at establishing peace. NATO’s evolving role in the Sahel will require a comprehensive approach that strikes a balance between counterterrorism operations and long-term development and stabilization initiatives. To succeed, the alliance must work closely with local actors while adapting to a rapidly shifting geopolitical landscape in which Russian and Chinese ambitions pose an ever-growing challenge to Western influence.
Ana is a consultant and analyst specializing in security and governance issues. She is a partner at SOTER4 and a lead researcher at the International Observatory for Terrorism Studies (OIET), where she also coordinates the Observatory of West Africa program. Ana leads multiple projects and research teams focused on defense, peace, and security, particularly in the Sahel, North Africa, and the Middle East. She collaborates with national and international organizations and universities in Spain and has authored several publications in academic and non-academic journals. Ana holds a degree in International Relations from Rey Juan Carlos University and a Master's in Geopolitics and Strategic Studies from Carlos III University of Madrid.