Introduction: A scientific and technological tsunami
The tsunami of scientific discoveries, technological inventions, and applications is in the process of revolutionizing the fate of humanity and nature. But does man also change in his deepest humanity? And does he continue to submit to the laws of evolution, as described by Darwin? Struggle for life and survival of the fittest? The history of mankind is characterized by a great deal of competition, the urge to conquer, aggressiveness, individual and collective selfishness, and power struggles-mainly economic and technological – often power struggle escalating into armed war.
In the age of weapons of mass destruction, it has become self-evident that humanity, through armed conflicts, is capable of destroying itself. Hence, peace promotion is of great importance through cooperation, solidarity, and mutual understanding. Significant international initiatives were taken, especially after the Second World War, such as establishing the United Nations and numerous international and multilateral cooperation institutions between countries and peoples. And yet, warfare continues on Earth, i.e., today in Ukraine and Gaza, with the danger of unleashing a fatal and even apocalyptic escalation.
In addition, scientific and technological innovations have led to a profound change in the methods of warfare, causing fewer human casualties. Still, the damage done to citizens and societies concerned is all the greater. And by that, I mean cyberwar and all kinds of high-tech means, which are used like hacking, disinformation, spying, etc.
Cyberwar and ‘La condition humaine’
Cyberwar can be considered as a new kind of warfare, distinct from traditional forms of conflict. While traditional warfare involves physical combat, cyberwar operates primarily in the digital realm, focusing on using computers, networks, and information systems to attack or disrupt an adversary’s infrastructure, information, or capabilities. More recently, the appearance of Artificial Intelligence seems to announce a new revolution for better and for worse. High Tech innovations always confront humanity with ethical challenges and a fundamental responsibility: “How can all these innovations and transformations be transformed to improve the way of human living? What the French call: “La condition humaine. “
High-tech communication can improve cooperation, solidarity, scientific research, education, etc. However, they can also be mutated into weapons of individual or collective power struggle in cyberwar. A new kind of war is already being waged worldwide.
Cyberspace is a battlefield, unlike traditional war, which takes place on land, sea, or air. Cyberwar occurs in cyberspace—a domain that includes computer networks, internet systems, and the digital infrastructure of countries, governments, and private entities. This new domain allows for disruptive attacks without the need for physical presence or traditional military forces. It also makes large-scale and intrusive spying possible.
Cyberattacks can involve hacking into systems to steal sensitive information, disrupt operations, or alter data. For example, politically or state-sponsored hacking groups may target government databases, military systems, scientific research centers, or corporate secrets.
In the age of weapons of mass destruction, it has become self-evident that humanity, through armed conflicts, is capable of destroying itself.
Cyberwarfare can target critical infrastructure like power grids, water systems, and transportation networks, potentially causing widespread chaos. Cyberwarfare also promotes propaganda and misinformation by spreading disinformation or manipulating social media to influence public opinion, undermine trust in institutions, or interfere with elections.
Moreover, cyberwar is attractive to smaller states or non-state actors because it requires fewer resources than traditional military engagements.
A cyberattack can cause significant damage at a fraction of the cost of traditional warfare, leveling the playing field between technologically advanced and less advanced adversaries.
Cyberwarfare transcends borders and is not limited by geography. A cyberattack can be launched from anywhere worldwide, potentially affecting targets in another country instantaneously. This global interconnectedness adds to the complexity of adequate defense strategies.
Organizations like NATO have adapted their defense policies to include cyber defense strategies as part of collective security.
Cyberwar blurs traditional legal frameworks governing warfare, such as the Geneva Conventions. Questions arise about what constitutes an act of war in cyberspace, when and how nations should respond, and whether certain cyberweapons should be regulated like traditional arms.
Nations now invest heavily in cybersecurity measures, developing defensive systems to protect critical infrastructure, private sectors, and government networks from cyberattacks. Organizations like NATO have adapted their defense policies to include cyber defense strategies as part of collective security.
Spying: Discussions about the intersection of technology, security, and geopolitics
Modern high-tech spying methods lead to a new kind of war, marked by its unique domain, tactics, and impact. It represents a shift from traditional kinetic warfare to digital conflict, where states, non-state actors, and individuals can engage in hostile actions that have wide-ranging consequences in both the military and civilian spheres. The rules, strategies, and defenses against cyber warfare are still evolving, making it a critical area of focus for governments and institutions worldwide.
While customs control does use advanced technologies to enhance security, the potential for these tools to be misused as spy technology is a valid concern. Ensuring a balance between effective border control and the protection of individual privacy is crucial, and it requires careful regulation, oversight, and public engagement.
Several cases of possible spying within the EU have already been examined and submitted to the EU Commission, the EU parliament, and even high courts in several member states and even to the European Court of Justice.
Most vulnerable are trade agreements with non-European companies, even Chinese companies, specializing in security inspection products and services, particularly scanning and detection equipment used in customs control, border security, and other high-security environments. These companies provide a wide range of advanced scanning and detection systems used mainly for inspecting luggage, cargo, vehicles, and containers at borders, airports, ports, and other critical infrastructure.
The China-manufactured equipment is used in many countries worldwide, and it has been a significant supplier of scanning technology to customs, border control, and security services globally. Also, in the EU, border and customs control is essential, and the Chinese equipment is efficient and cheap. However, Chinese companies have also been subject to various controversies, particularly in Western countries.
Experts: There is a risk that the Chinese government could access data collected by its systems outside
Experts argue that since Chinese companies are mostly Chinese state-owned enterprises, there is a risk that the Chinese government could access data collected by its systems outside China. Some countries have restricted or banned this equipment due to these concerns.
The discussion in the West has been caught in the broader geopolitical tension between China and Western countries, particularly the United States and its allies, over cybersecurity, espionage, and the influence of Chinese technology companies in critical infrastructure. Western companies, moreover, are an alternative since they are in the market for security scanning technology.
These concerns have led to increased scrutiny and restrictions on using scanning equipment from non-EU countries, particularly China and Russia, and make it a focal point in policy discussions about the intersection of technology, security, and geopolitics.
Rethinking the Defense Policy
The war in Ukraine on Europe’s eastern border and the complications that may arise from it forces the European Union, always in the NATO context, to elaborate on a more extensive, adapted, namely European defense. We must consider very far-reaching technological evolutions that require rethinking European defense cooperation, both in content and politics.
The present EU defense policy is based mainly on the Treaty of Maastricht, formally known as the Treaty on European Union (TEU). It was signed in 1992 and established the foundation for the European Union as we know it today. While the treaty focused heavily on economic and monetary union, it also introduced provisions related to a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), which included the groundwork for a potential common European defense policy.
The CFSP was introduced as one of the pillars of the European Union.
The treaty stated that the CFSP could eventually lead to a common defense policy, which “might in time lead to a common defense.” This language was intentionally cautious, as proposed by the Belgian delegation I was leading as foreign minister during the treaty negotiations in 1990-1992, acknowledging the sensitive nature of defense matters among member states. Notably, the two nuclear powers within the EU – France and the UK – wanted to maintain their decisional autonomy. Maastricht had the merit of opening the door for future developments.
A Typical European Defense Budget: Revitalizing the Western European Union (WEU)?
Today, compelling and urgent reasons exist to work on a common European defense policy. Several European member states are a coalition of the willing, why not the Benelux countries? – may take the initiative, based on a common memorandum, to involve other Member States in in-depth consultations.
From the outset, we must look forward to cooperation with the United Kingdom, a nuclear-powered country with great military merit. A formula of far-reaching military cooperation with the United Kingdom also meets the wishes of all those who want to close the sad chapter of Brexit by cooperation in a domain as important as defense.
The military conflict in and around Ukraine on the eastern border of the European Union is forcing European leaders to boost both the quantity and the quality of defense.
This can only be done if this combination is sufficiently intense. The question immediately arises as to the inevitable additional budgetary expenditure required for this purpose. National efforts are complicated, and therefore, we must also look for a European solution with a European budget and European funding, as has recently happened with the next-generation program, for an amount of EUR 750 billion, set up by the European Union to enable the Member States to overcome the consequences of the COVID 19 crisis. This created a European debt and opened, as a first step, the way to a real European fiscal policy with revenue and expenditure under the leadership of a European finance minister and, of course, after the approval of the European Parliament.
Such significant changes in the functioning of the EU will have to be carried out by the Member States and ultimately be confirmed by amending the Treaties. However, this is a complex and cumbersome procedure requiring the Member States to organize a referendum and obtain unanimity among them, which involves significant political risks, as was demonstrated in 2005 when France and the Netherlands rejected the text of a European Constitution. This risk may be reduced by stating in advance that the countries with positive voting will form a “coalition of the willing.” This formula could also facilitate the association of Great Britain with a new European defense initiative. In this context, it would be pertinent to raise the question of a possible revitalization of the Western European Union WEU.
The Western European Union (WEU)
The Western European Union (WEU) was a European defense and security organization established in 1948. It was originally formed by the Treaty of Brussels, which Belgium, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom signed. The WEU was intended to provide mutual defense and promote cooperation in defense and security matters among its member states in the aftermath of World War II. The WEU worked closely with NATO and was seen as a European pillar of the NATO alliance. NATO remained the primary defense organization for Europe, while the WEU focused more specifically on European defense cooperation.
With the end of the Cold War and the development of the European Union’s (EU) Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP), the WEU’s role began to diminish. The EU took on more responsibilities in defense and security matters, gradually declining the importance of the WEU.
In 2010, WEU member states decided to terminate the organization, and the WEU was officially dissolved on June 30, 2011. Much of its defense and security responsibilities were transferred to the EU.
A new WEU adapted to the needs of future-oriented defense could be the most efficient idea.
In any case, cooperation with NATO is required. Given that many EU members are also NATO members, aligning the EU’s common defense policy with NATO’s strategic framework is crucial to avoid duplication and ensure cohesion.
Using existing defense institutions
Strengthening EU Defense Institutions should also be realized by establishing or reinforcing EU institutions responsible for defense policy, such as the European Defense Agency (EDA) and the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO). These bodies can help coordinate defense planning, procurement, and operations. And create a unified command structure, which is a central command structure within the EU for coordinating joint military operations. This could be modeled after NATO’s command structure but tailored to EU-specific missions.
Military Capabilities should be harmonized by encouraging member states to harmonize their military capabilities, including standardizing equipment and procedures. This would enhance interoperability and reduce duplication.
Joint Procurement and R&D are needed, particularly in the fight against spying activities and cyber-attacks. Promoting joint defense procurement programs and collaborative research and development (R&D) initiatives to leverage economies of scale and foster innovation in military technology is highly desirable.
Joint Military Exercises must be organized, and Rapid Response Units must be created, responding to common customs control under EU command.
These reforms need democratic public support and communication. To garner this approval, EU leaders must communicate the benefits and importance of a common defense policy. This can be done through public consultations, media campaigns, and educational programs.
It is essential to prepare for crisis management. The EU must regularly update its defense strategy and capabilities to address new and evolving threats, such as cyber warfare, terrorism, and hybrid warfare.
Engaging in Global Defense Initiatives should not distract European leaders from their participation in global initiatives aimed at conflict prevention, arms control, non-proliferation, and contributing to international peace and security.
“Si vis pacem, para bellum” is a wise Roman saying that has always remained relevant.
