Dr. Sedat Cevikparmak & Dr. Saban Adana
Executive Summary: The Era of Strategic Compulsion
The global defense and security landscape is at a turning point. For decades, the Defense Industrial Base (DIB) has relied on globally optimized, cost-efficient supply chains. But in today’s world, defined by great power competition, economic coercion, and the weaponization of trade, this model has become a liability.
Geopolitical tensions are no longer abstract risks. They are direct threats to the operational readiness, technological edge, and strategic autonomy of the United States. The DIB’s dependence on foreign suppliers, many located in adversarial or unstable regions, has created systemic vulnerabilities that could be exploited in a crisis.
This op-ed presents a strategic roadmap for reconstituting a resilient, secure, and future-ready industrial base. It outlines the structural risks posed by geopolitical fragmentation, identifies critical material dependencies, and proposes actionable policy and technological solutions. The time for incremental adjustments has passed. What’s needed now is a decisive shift from managing risk to enforcing resilience through strategic compulsion.
1. The New Global Order: Geopolitics as a Systemic Threat to the DIB
Geopolitical friction from targeted export controls to escalating trade wars is no longer merely a commercial headwind but the primary driver of vulnerability within the defense supply chain. The systems that produce advanced weapon platforms, microelectronics, and noncombat goods depend on a vast global network of over 200,000 suppliers. Many of these suppliers are located in, or rely on, regions that are geopolitically unstable or adversarial to U.S. interests. This reliance on foreign sources for mission-critical items is considered a national security risk because access to materials or components could be suddenly curtailed. The resulting threats are seen in several chokepoints and continuing dependencies that leave the Defense Industrial Base vulnerable to systemic shocks in the foreseeable future: The nation is nearly 100% dependent on imports for commercial titanium sponge 1, a foundational material for high-performance aircraft and naval components. Foreign adversaries control a 100% monopoly over the world’s refined heavy rare earth elements, minerals essential for the advanced magnets in nearly 1,900 U.S. weapon systems. This reliance extends to other critical materials: the United States is 100% import dependent for antimony, a key chemical used in infrared sensors and flame retardants for military gear.2 The supply chain for processed graphite, critical for jet engine components, body armor, and advanced batteries, faces a similar issue, with the U.S. 100% reliant on foreign sources for the refined material. Compounding this, the military historically relied entirely on a single foreign company for the chemical needed to produce the solid rocket fuel that propels HELLFIRE missiles.3 Furthermore, domestic fabrication of global semiconductors considered to be the digital backbone of modern defense by many has stalled at just 12%4, and the U.S. imports nearly 50% of the value of its advanced precision machine tools, essential for manufacturing sensitive components.
1.1. Dual-Use Technology and the Breakdown of Multilateral Norms
The weaponization of dual-use technology which are items with both civilian and military applications, is forcing the dissolution of decades-old multilateral control frameworks. The European Commission, for example, is centralizing export control powers to more rapidly restrict Russia’s access to advanced technologies, including quantum equipment and semiconductors.1 This action is particularly significant because it represents a clear departure from standard consensus-based governance systems. The EU is now acting without securing international agreement, bypassing the Wassenaar Arrangement (WA), where Russia has historically blocked new listings.5 This is a profound institutional shift that prioritizes security and speed over consensus, reflecting a broader trend where international cooperation is failing to keep pace with strategic competition.6
This new, unilateral approach increases unpredictability for the DIB, requiring defense contractors to navigate a fragmented, politically-driven patchwork of controls that can change rapidly and disrupt access to critical components, especially in areas like advanced computing, semiconductor manufacturing, and additive manufacturing.6 This shift from consensus-based governance to unilateral controls marks a new era of fragmented global regulation, one that defense contractors must now navigate with agility and foresight.
1.2. Strategic Containment: The US-China Conflict and Technology Chokeholds
The conflict between the United States and China has fundamentally evolved from a trade dispute to a strategic competition focused on control over key technological ecosystems, with technology viewed as the most important part of the U.S. economy.
The US focus on forced technology transfer and export restrictions on semiconductors reveals the core objective: containment of China’s technological rise.7 This is a conflict of economic systems. The reciprocal actions such as China’s anti-dumping tariffs on EU pork products, widely framed as retaliation for EU tariffs on Chinese electric vehicles, and China’s investigations into U.S. chip-makers demonstrate that no sector is shielded from policy backlash and that economic leverage is now a core tool of statecraft. Even as US lawmakers and presidents hold rare talks with Chinese counterparts to seek a way out of strained ties, the fundamental friction over semiconductor chips, technology transfer, and national security remains a permanent feature.8
2. The Core Vulnerability: Critical Materials and Industrial Base Reconstitution
The DIB’s most acute vulnerability lies not in finished systems, but in the elemental inputs required for those systems. A heavy reliance on adversarial nations for foundational materials and components creates an immediate and unacceptable strategic risk.
2.1. The Weaponization of Rare Earths
Rare earth elements and the magnets they produce are indispensable building blocks for both commercial technology and national security platforms. These components such as magnets, batteries, and semiconductors enable nearly all advanced electronics, including motors, generators, sensors, and actuators that are essential to satellites, drones, and virtually all military systems.
China’s decades-long campaign to consolidate control over the rare earth industry has given it a potential chokehold on the DIB. The Chinese Communist Party has previously demonstrated its willingness to restrict rare earth exports, such as the 2010 action against Japan. This proves that China could, with a single export control action, shut down almost all critical U.S. defense and commercial production lines reliant on rare earth magnets.9 This critical material dependency is a failure point that must be systematically addressed through industrial reconstitution.
2.2. The Strategic Pivot: From Cost Optimization to Industrial Mobilization
In response to sustained turbulence, multinational corporations are implementing strategies like “China+1” and reshoring to prioritize resilience over pure cost efficiency. This commercial trend offers a template for national security strategy, shifting the calculus to a “Total Cost of Ownership” (TCO) model that accounts for the hidden costs of geopolitical risk, logistics, and supply fragility.10
A notable example is GE Appliances, which relocated production of gas ranges and refrigerators from China and Mexico to U.S. facilities.11 Executives cited that with automation and workforce upskilling, “the math works” for domestic production when factoring in the full lifecycle cost of goods, including reduced waste and lower inventory carrying costs.
The TCO model reframes resilience not as a cost burden, but as a strategic investment in continuity and control. This rationale should guide Defense Industrial Base (DIB) investments, demonstrating that purposeful redundancy and domestic production are not only feasible but essential for long-term national security—regardless of short-term political or market fluctuations.
3. Policy Mechanisms and the Visibility Imperative
Addressing DIB vulnerabilities requires immediate governmental action, leveraging statutory tools to overcome structural barriers and enforcing deep supply chain visibility across the entire defense ecosystem.
3.1. Empowering the Defense Production Act (DPA)
The Defense Production Act (DPA) is the government’s most important statutory tool for shaping and scaling the DIB in times of crisis. Its timely reauthorization is vital for supporting targeted, high-priority investments in munitions, critical materials, and propulsion systems already under strain.13 This mechanism is essential for reshoring key segments of the industrial base and addressing the lack of domestic manufacturing capacity for items like rare earth magnets. The DPA allows implementing agencies to address specific requirements and support the development of emerging technologies and processes while affirming the U.S. commitment to supply chain resilience and allied readiness.
3.2. Mandating Visibility Beyond the First Tier
The U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) has acknowledged its exposure, noting that it has limited visibility into the origin of materials in its supply chain. While the DOD estimates it relies on over 200,000 suppliers, current efforts to gather supplier information are often uncoordinated, providing little insight into the vast majority of suppliers, particularly those providing raw materials and parts.14
This lack of deep network visibility is an unacceptable strategic vulnerability. A small-scale disruption at a third-tier supplier—such as a rare earth mine or chemical processor—can halt production across an entire weapons system. Yet these suppliers often remain invisible to prime contractors and the DoD alike. To address this, the DoD must adopt leading commercial practices for supply chain mapping and risk monitoring. It should also establish a centralized, integrated office tasked with enforcing visibility and accountability across all tiers of the Defense Industrial Base. vulnerability. A small-scale disruption at a third-tier supplier such as a critical mineral mine can halt production for an entire weapons program. The DOD must implement leading commercial practices for supply chain visibility and establish an integrated office to enforce visibility across all tiers of the DIB.
4. The Bureaucratic and Technological Roadmap
Navigating this complex landscape requires a strategic reorientation within the defense bureaucracy, moving from reactive problem-solving to proactive, data-driven planning enabled by advanced technology.
4.1. Mastering Scenario Planning and Contingency
In a world defined by uncertainty, defense planning must move beyond single-point forecasting to a multi-variable, probabilistic model. Scenario planning is a formalized framework for anticipating future disruptions by analyzing critical uncertainties, such as geopolitical developments, regulatory changes, and material shortages.15
Defense leaders must employ multi-decade scenario models to identify key stakeholders (from customers to sub-tier suppliers) and establish “driving forces” (critical uncertainties) to map out a range of plausible futures.15 By transforming this into a cross-functional strategic discipline collaborating with geopolitical analysts and legal experts the DIB can prepare for worst-case scenarios and ensure mission continuity.16
4.2. Leveraging AI and Blockchain for Security Vetting
Technology is not a convenience; it is a force multiplier for national security vetting and resilience. The complexity and speed of geopolitical change necessitate dynamic risk assessment and continuous monitoring, especially for the Information Communications Technology (ICT) supply chain, which is critical to all DIB operations.17
- AI for Dynamic Risk Scoring: Artificial intelligence (AI) can analyze structured and unstructured data (news, market reports, transaction records) to generate predictions and identify unseen risks like geopolitical shifts or supplier financial issues.18 AI-powered systems provide dynamic risk scoring and continuous monitoring, allowing the DIB to stay ahead of emerging threats and rapidly suggest alternative suppliers or contingency plans.18 Companies like Lenovo, for example, use AI to predict delivery dates and delays across its vast supplier network.
- Blockchain for Transparency and Traceability: To overcome the “first-tier only” problem, blockchain technology provides an immutable and auditable ledger that can enhance supply chain transparency and traceability beyond the first tier.19 This digital footprint for a product’s journey is crucial for verifying the origin and authenticity of components, particularly in high-risk areas like microelectronics and critical minerals. While striking a balance between transparency and confidentiality is required to protect proprietary information, technology offers a robust pathway to accountability and security. AI and blockchain are not futuristic luxuries; they are essential tools for real-time risk detection, supplier authentication, and mission assurance. Their integration into DIB operations is not just a technological upgrade, it is a strategic necessity.
4.3. Stockpile Strategy and Policy Alignment
A long-term strategy for DIB resilience must include proactive policy measures to secure material reserves. The DOD has established a Critical Minerals Task Force to address vulnerabilities in the defense supply chain, including reforms for the National Defense Stockpile (NDS). A core policy action is the development of rules to prevent sales of material from the NDS to adversary nations specifically China, Iran, North Korea, and Russia.20 This policy alignment, coupled with collaboration between the DOD and industry to align trade policy with national security goals, is essential for creating stable frameworks for predictability in critical material streams.
| Strategic Threat | Core DIB Vulnerability | Policy Mechanism Required | Technological Imperative |
| Geopolitical Fragmentation (e.g., China tariffs, EU unilateral controls) | Over-reliance on foreign sources for critical materials | DPA Reauthorization to fund domestic magnet/material production | AI for dynamic risk scoring and threat prediction |
| Dual-Use Weaponization (e.g., semiconductors, quantum tech) | Limited visibility beyond first-tier suppliers | DOD Task Force to prevent NDS material sales to adversaries (China, Russia) | Blockchain for irrefutable traceability of components |
| Supply Chain Chokeholds (e.g., Rare Earths) | Operational fragility and lack of redundancy | Strategic Reshoring based on TCO, not just labor cost | Deep Network Visibility tools for multi-tier vetting |
Conclusion: From Strategic Pause to Strategic Action
October 2025 finds the Defense Industrial Base at a strategic inflection point. The forces reshaping how mission-critical goods are sourced and produced are permanent. Tariffs, export bans, and geopolitical maneuverings have morphed into structural features of the global economy. The legacy supply chain, optimized for efficiency, is now a systemic vulnerability exposing national security to foreign control.
Survival and technological superiority hinges on a determined strategic reorientation. This requires a new economic calculus where resilience is a non-negotiable strategic investment. It demands policy action, leveraging the DPA to reconstitute the industrial base and enforcing deep network visibility across the entire ecosystem. We must embrace advanced technologies like AI and blockchain to secure the ICT supply chain and vet every tier of the DIB. The cost of bureaucratic inertia is no longer just lost margin; it is the erosion of strategic independence in a world where geopolitics, not just markets, writes the rules. In a world where geopolitics, not just markets, write the rules, resilience is no longer optional. It is the price of sovereignty.
Works Cited
- Titanium Statistics and Information by National Minerals Information Center
- Mineral Commodity Summaries 2024 – ANTIMONY Data Release
https://data.usgs.gov/datacatalog/data/USGS:65b7d72ad34e36a39045b48f
- Defense Industrial Base: Actions Needed to Address Risks Posed by Dependence on Foreign Suppliers
https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-25-107283.pdf
- Semiconductor Industry Association Factbook
https://www.semiconductors.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/05/SIA-2024-Factbook.pdf
- FT: EU strengthens export controls to restrict Russia’s access to advanced tech | Caliber. Az, accessed September 24, 2025, https://caliber.az/en/post/ft-eu-strengthens-export-controls-to-restrict-russia-s-access-to-advanced-tech
- EU Updates Dual-Use Export Control List: Key Changes for Emerging Technologies, accessed September 24, 2025, https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/eu-updates-dual-use-export-control-list-9754493/
- The Contentious U.S.-China Trade Relationship
https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/contentious-us-china-trade-relationship
- US lawmakers hold rare talks with Chinese defence minister, accessed September 24, 2025, https://indianexpress.com/article/world/us-lawmakers-hold-rare-talks-with-chinese-defence-minister-10264808/
- The Consequences of China’s New Rare Earths Export Restrictions
https://www.csis.org/analysis/consequences-chinas-new-rare-earths-export-restrictions
- Driving factors of China Plus One | (ISIS) Malaysia, accessed September 24, 2025, https://www.isis.org.my/wp-content/uploads/2025/05/Driving-factors-of-China-Plus-One.pdf
- GE APPLIANCES ANNOUNCES HISTORIC $3 BILLION INVESTMENT TO EXPAND U.S. MANUFACTURING, accessed September 24, 2025, https://pressroom.geappliances.com/news/ge-appliances-announces-historic-3-billion-investment-to-expand-u-s-manufacturing
- GE Appliances shifts more production to US as part of a $3 billion investment – AP News, accessed September 24, 2025, https://apnews.com/article/ge-appliances-manufacturing-china-mexico-c492e8a0a660538ae8e2c775f1eb0525
- The Defense Production Act: An Important National Security Tool, But It Requires Work
- Defense Industrial Base: Actions Needed to Address Risks Posed by Dependence on Foreign Suppliers
https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-25-107283
- How interactive ‘Scenario Game’ helps navigate uncertainty and develop foresight
https://www.weforum.org/stories/2025/02/scenario-game-navigate-uncertainty-and-develop-foresight/
- Supply Chain Scenario Planning: 4 Steps
https://www.gartner.com/en/supply-chain/trends/supply-chain-scenario-planning
- Securing Defense-Critical Supply Chains
- Leveraging Generative AI In Supply Chain Risk Assessment And Mitigation – Forbes, accessed September 24, 2025, https://www.forbes.com/councils/forbestechcouncil/2025/02/13/leveraging-generative-ai-in-supply-chain-risk-assessment-and-mitigation/
- Blockchain technology in supply chain management: Innovations, applications, and challenges
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.teler.2025.100204
- Elevating the Role of Critical Minerals for Development and Security
https://www.csis.org/analysis/elevating-role-critical-minerals-development-and-security
Dr. Sedat Cevikparmak is an Assistant Professor of Supply Chain Management at Florida Gulf Coast University (FGCU), Lutgert College of Business. He is also Chairman of the Board of Directors at the NATO Veterans Initiative (NAVI). He earned his Ph.D. in Logistics Systems from the University of North Texas. A 1997 graduate of USMA at West Point, he served in the Turkish Armed Forces until 2016, with his last role at the International Military Staff – NATO HQ in Brussels.
Dr. Saban Adana is an Associate Professor of Supply Chain Management and Mulwick Scholar at John Carroll University’s Boler College of Business (2020–present). His teaching and research focus on supply chain resilience, performance-based contracting, analytics, and complexity. He earned his Ph.D. in Supply Chain Management from the University of North Texas (2017–2020) and his B.A. in International Relations and Systems Engineering from the United States Military Academy at West Point (1998–2002). He also holds master’s degrees in National Security Affairs and National and International Security Strategies and Management and Leadership, obtained from the Naval Postgraduate School and the Turkish Army War College, respectively. Before entering academia, Dr. Adana served in the Turkish Armed Forces (2002–2016), including an assignment as Military Assistant to the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) at NATO Headquarters in Belgium. He is passionate about bridging research and practice to help organizations design adaptive, data-driven, and resilient supply chains in a rapidly changing global environment.